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A TYRANNOSAURUS-REX APTLY NAMED "SUE":




In August 1990, commercial fossil hunters from the Black Hills
Geologic Institute ("Black Hills") discovered the remains of an almost-
complete Tyrannosaurus Rex skeleton located in the Badlands of South
Dakota.l Named "Sue" after her discoverer, 2 the fossil immediately be-
came the subject of controversy. Although many of the facts were disputed,
the collectors gave the purported owner of the land, a Native American
rancher named Maurice Williams, a check for $5,000, which he cashed, and
the collectors excavated Sue.3 The fair market value of a T-Rex skeleton
with that degree of completeness was over eight million dollars. 4
Once the discovery began to garner publicity, Williams began a fierce
court battle to rescind the contract with Black Hills, claiming that the
$5,000 was merely a payment to inspect the property for potential fossils. 5
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Dartmouth College; J.D., 1999, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Alexander J. Bolla, Brannon P.
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1. Larry McShane, Museum Pays $8.4 Million for T-Rex: 65-Million-Year-Old Fossil to Go
on Display in Chicago in 2000, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1997, at AI0. See also Phillip Zonkel, Sue-
per Sized Awesome T. Rex Fossil Gets Presented in its Full Glory at Natural History Museum,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 29, 2000 at L6 (describing Sue's discovery and the rareness of finding a
ninety-percent complete Tyrannosaurus Rex).
2. See SUE HENDRICKSON AS TOLD TO KIMBERLY WEINBERGER, HUNT FOR THE PAST: MY
LIFE AS AN EXPLORER 23-29 (2001) (detailing how Sue Hendrickson, a sometime fossil collector
and treasurer hunter, spotted the fossils embedded in a cliff). Hendrickson has authored a chil-
dren's book about her career and the discovery of the dinosaur. Id.
3. Curse of T. Rex (Nova television broadcast Feb. 25, 1997). In October of 1997, Sotheby's
auctioned Sue off. In the face of intense bidding, the Chicago Field Museum purchased Sue for
$8,362,500. See McShane, supra note 1, at AI0 (stating that the Chicago Field Museum "paid a
staggering $8.4 million" for the fossil).
4. McShane, supra note 1, at A10.
5. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. Dept. of Justice, 812 F. Supp. 1015, 1017
(D.S.D. 1993) ("On August 27, 1990, [Black Hillsj issued a check to Maurice Williams for
$5,000, alleging that it was 'for title to the fossil and the right to excavate the fossil from his
land."'), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part sub nom. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. S.D. Sch.
of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d 737 (8th Cir. 1993).
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He was not the only one with a bone to pick. At one point, the parties
claiming ownership of Sue included Black Hills, Williams, the Cheyenne
River Sioux tribe (Williams' land was within the boundaries of their reser-
vation), and the federal government (the government had held the land in
trust for Williams so it was not subject to tax forfeiture). 6
Ultimately, the district court,7 and then the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals,8 ruled against Black Hills. The structure of the trust required gov-
ernment permission to sell land.9 Holding that Sue's bones were part of the
"land," the Eighth Circuit determined that Sue could only be sold if
government permission had been granted, and, as Black Hills had never
requested permission, it had no claim to the fossil.10 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that the federal government held the fossil in trust for
Williams. 1l In addition to the pages of the federal reporter and in the press,
Sue's story has also been told in two books,12 one of which, Rex Appeal,
was written by fossil hunter and Black Hills founder Peter Larson.13
An understanding of contract law and contract defenses is essential to
understanding and analyzing the question of Sue's ownership.14 Sue's case
involves the high-stakes world of fossil hunting and collecting, a subject
6. The government also mounted a criminal prosecution of the fossil hunters for unrelated
instances of the theft of fossils from federal land. United States v. Larson, 110 F.3d 620 (8th Cir.
1997). Although the possibility of criminal sanctions for taking fossils from federal or tribal lands
is also an interesting subject, the criminal law dimensions are beyond the scope of this article. See
Patrick K. Duffy & Lois A. Lofgren, Jurassic Farce: A Critical Analysis of the Government's
Seizure of "Sue [TM]," A Sixty-Five-Million-Year-Old Tyrannosaurus Rex Fossil, 39 S.D. L.
REV. 478 (1994) (presenting Black Hills' viewpoint on the criminal charges). While useful, the
article is also extremely partisan, as Duffy was Larson's attorney in the criminal trial. See Black
Hills, 812 F. Supp. at 1016 (listing Duffy as the attorney of record for the plaintiff). The Black
Hills Institute later discovered another T-Rex skeleton that they named "Duffy" in gratitude for
their lawyer's services.
7. Black Hills, 812 F. Supp. at 1022.
8. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d at 739.
9. Id. at 741.
10. Id. at 743-44.
11. Id. at 744.
12. The first book, written by Steve Fiffer, a former journalist and attorney, is a well-written
account that provides a multi-faceted and balanced view of the case, including the point of view of
many of the participants. STEVE FIFFER, TYRANNOSAURUS SUE: THE EXTRAORDINARY SAGA OF
THE LARGEST, MOST FOUGHT OVER T. REX EVER FOUND (W.H. Freeman and Co. 2000).
13. The second book, written by fossil-hunter Peter Larson and his ex-wife, former journalist
Kristin Donnan, is, unsurprisingly, a partisan re-telling of the case from Larson's perspective.
PETER L. LARSON & KRISTIN DONNAN, REX APPEAL: THE AMAZING STORY OF SUE, THE
DINOSAUR THAT CHANGED SCIENCE, THE LAW, AND MY LIFE (Invisible Cities Press 2002).
14. See Dana G. Jim, Great Property Case: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the South Dakota
Fossil Cases, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791 (2002) (suggesting that Sue's case could be used to teach
property law). Property law and Native American law are vital to analyzing Sue's ownership, and
it was on these grounds that the actual case was decided. Therefore, in this Article I concentrate
solely on the contracts questions that Sue's case raises and how law professors can use Sue's case
to teach contracts defenses.
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matter that students find appealing. Besides piquing student interest, Sue's
case also allows for a far-ranging discussion of many contract defenses.
When discussing the contract between Maurice Williams and the Black
Hills Institute, students begin formulating arguments based on the doctrines
of unilateral mistake, unequal bargaining power, capacity, unconscion-
ability, and the failure of a condition.
I provide this description of the teaching module I use for contract
defenses as one possible alternative to the Socratic method. As described in
the final portion of this Article, the Socratic method has come under attack
in recent years.15 In response to such criticisms, the lesson that I describe
provides a constructive alternative to the Socratic method, based on the
theory of problem-based learning and the appropriate incorporation of
technology in the classroom. However, unlike other problem-based learn-
ing approaches, this particular lesson can be adopted without having to
change the entire structure of an already-existing course, and does not mean
the utter extinction of a traditional casebook.16 Rather, the exercise supple-
ments the typical coverage of contract defenses in the major casebooks.
II. TEACHING CONTRACT DEFENSES: REWARDS AND
CHALLENGES
Teaching contract defenses is one of the more difficult parts of the
basic contracts course. During the first portion of the course, 17 I spend a
great deal of time on basic concepts-the rules of offer and acceptance,
consideration, and promissory estoppel-as well as helping students
become familiar with basic legal skills, such as how to discern the holding
of a case from dicta; how to master the standard arguments about bright line
15. See infra Part IV (citing numerous scholars and authors who are critical of the Socratic
method).
16. See Douglas L. Leslie, Approaches to Teaching Contracts: How Not to Teach Contracts,
and any Other Course: Powerpoint, Laptops, and the Casefile Method, 44 ST. Louis. U. L.J. 1289
(2000) (advocating adoption of the author's case files in lieu of traditional casebook).
17. My first-year contracts class at Cumberland Law School, Samford University, is a year-
long course. Currently, I employ the casebook compiled by Randy Barnett, as it includes almost
all of the "casebook classics" that are studied widely at law schools around the country. RANDY
E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE (3d ed. 2003). Choosing a contracts casebook
is a somewhat daunting task for a new law professor. For several reviews of contracts casebooks,
see Kellye Y. Testy, Intention in Tension, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 319 (1997) (reviewing Barnett
casebook); Michael B. Kelly, Reflections on Barnett's Contracts, Cases and Doctrine, 20
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 343 (1997) (same); Geoffrey R. Watson, Reviews: A Casebook for All
Seasons?, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 277 (1997) (reviewing Alan Farnsworth's casebook); Lenora
Ledwon, Storytelling and Contracts, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 117 (2001) (reviewing Kastely,
Hom and Post's casebook, Contracting Law). One influential article by Mary Joe Frug has had an
impact on the way casebooks are structured and the way that I teach my contracts class. See Mary
Jo Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV.
1065 (1985).
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rules versus legal standards; and how to discern the various sources of con-
tract law. Despite the oddity and strange amusement value in the cases of
dissolute smoking and drinking nephews,18 sick children at sea who run up
medical bills,19 and loyal employees who dive off platforms to save their
bosses, 20 the first part of the course must necessarily focus on teaching
basic legal skills.
During the next portion of the course, the focus is on the interpretation
of contracts, issues of parole evidence, and the intent of the parties as con-
trasted with legal background norms. At this point, the students begin to
realize that many of the legal "rules" they are learning, such as parole
evidence, are actually things that I like to describe as "rules with a hole in
the middle of them," capable of being categorized and argued either way. 21
By the time we reach promissory estoppel, students begin to realize that
some aspects of law are indeterminate or are subject to argument, and are
not just a clean list of rules that one may easily memorize. This concept,
along with the idea that the common law might provide one way of re-
solving an issue, while the Uniform Commercial Code may provide an
entirely different, and sometimes contrary approach,22 is one that confuses
students until they have had enough time to digest it.
18. See Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891) (holding that an uncle's promise to his
nephew to reward him if he abstained from drinking and smoking was supported by
consideration).
19. See Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. 207 (1825) (holding that a father was not liable for
reimbursing a good Samaritan for his grown son's medical care under contract theory).
20. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (holding that, despite doctrinal
problems with past and moral consideration, an employer's estate was responsible for periodic
payments to its employee who earlier had saved the employer's life by diving off the upper floor
of a mill to stop a pine block from falling on the employer).
21. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 60-61 (1974) (describing the doctrines of
consideration and promissory estoppel as "matter and antimatter" and "Restatement and anti-
restatement").
22. Compare the common law mirror image rule in Ardente v. Horan, 366 A.2d 162 (R.I.
1976) (holding that acceptance had to be "mirror image" of offer, or else it functioned as counter-
offer), with U.C.C. § 2-207 (2003) (stating that the response of adding or subtracting terms could
still function as counteroffer, unless the differences constitute a "material alteration" of the terms
or the offer was conditioned only on that particular set of terms); compare the common law rule
requiring consideration to keep an option open as in Dickenson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463, 466
(1874) (stating that the "postscript" on a contract, without consideration, is void) with U.C.C. § 2-
205 (2003) (allowing merchants to hold options open without consideration so long as there is a
signed writing and the period of time does not exceed three months); compare Alaska Packers'
Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1902) (describing the common law requirement of
additional consideration to make a contract modification binding) with U.C.C. § 2-209 (2003)
(permitting contract modification without additional consideration); compare the common law
requirement of the duty to mitigate damages under the common law, as articulated in Rockingham
County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929) (holding that, upon breach, the other
party must stop performing duties under the contract so as not to increase the harm), with U.C.C. §
2-704 (2003) (allowing seller, after breach of contract, to complete the manufacture of the good so
as not to waste work already in process).
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It is only during the third portion of the course, contract defenses, that
the first-year students have cut their teeth enough as legal thinkers so that
we can have an intelligent discussion of the legal issues. But the defenses
are often tricky for students to learn. Far too often students are willing to
accept what the contract says at face value and conclude that the analysis is
over, just assuming the validity of an ostensible arm's-length transaction. 23
Beyond teaching my students how to read the contract carefully and
understand what it says, I am also interested in teaching them to anticipate
any problems with the contract that may arise. But beyond forcing a stu-
dent to question the validity of the written word, a student must also learn to
distinguish between the theoretical basis for each contract defense, for
example, the difference between unconscionabilty and undue influence.
Additionally, students also must learn how to deploy the contract defenses
on behalf of a client.
Despite being "difficult," I find that contract defenses are one of the
more interesting parts of the course. Although contract law typically in-
volves parties who voluntarily assume a duty and are responsible for that
duty,24 with defenses the law acknowledges that there are some circum-
stances, either because of a flaw in the assent process, harshness of the
terms, or for some other equitable reason, that a voluntary duty will not be
enforced. Often where there is a question regarding duress, undue influ-
ence, or unconscionability, courts must draw a fine line between insulating
individuals from their own "bad deals" and preventing business practices
that are sharper than a T-Rex tooth.
III. TEACHING MODULE: APPLICATION OF CONTRACT
DEFENSES
To begin the teaching module, I show the class the video Curse of T.
Rex, part of the Nova television series that airs on the Public Broadcasting
Service. 25 The video features the story of Sue's discovery, and includes
interviews with Peter Larson, Maurice Williams, tribal members, and
prominent paleontologists. At approximately fifty minutes, the video is the
23. An arm's-length transaction with a T-Rex would be an interesting arrangement, given
their tiny forelimbs.
24. The idea that contractual duties are, in a sense, a form of strict liability is an old one,
tracing back to the 1600s. See Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897, 897 (1647) ("When the party
by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may,
notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it
by his contract.").
25. Curse of T. Rex (Nova television broadcast Feb. 25, 1997). See http://www.pbs.org/
(providing a location where Curse of T. Rex is available for purchase). Alternately, used copies
may be obtained from other sources, including E-bay.
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ideal length for showing to a class. I showed the video to my class after we
had finished the entire unit on contract defenses.
During the video, you may want to stop the tape to interpose questions.
For example, when the tribal leaders discuss how they have right to the
dinosaur, you can stop the tape to ask the class why they think that might or
might not be accurate. At other times, when Peter Larson is putting forth
his theory of ownership, you can likewise pose questions to the class,
asking them whether Larson is making statements that are partisan or
otherwise self-interested. Another possibility for stopping the tape is when
Maurice Williams is shown on camera with Larson and the fossil hunters.
Larson says that Sue will stay in South Dakota as part of the Black Hills
museum. In response, Williams states, "[u]nder that you'll say... Pete'll
say stolen from Maurice Williams."26 After an awkward moment of
silence, both the fossil hunters and Williams begin laughing.2 7 Rather than
show the whole video, you could stop the tape before the video reveals the
outcome of the civil trial over ownership and the criminal charges, which
occurs approximately forty minutes into the video. 28
Once the class has seen the video, I usually spend another class period
on discussion. I begin the discussion by asking the class to identify the
contracts issues that seemed to be salient in the video. This helps students
sharpen their issue-spotting skills.29 Then, I guide the discussion toward the
question of whether or not the students think the contract for the sale of Sue
is enforceable. One of the assumptions that I have the class make is that the
$5,000 payment is for removal of the dinosaur, not just for an inspection of
the land.30
If the discussion wanders, the students can be brought back to the
central point about contract defenses simply by asking the class to put
themselves in the position of Maurice Williams' lawyer. As an attorney for
Williams, they have to raise any and all contract defenses that they possibly
can, in order to claim ownership of the fossil. If, on the other hand, the
instructor wants to help the students with learning how to formulate
26. Curse of T. Rex (Nova television broadcast Feb. 25, 1997).
27. id.
28. Of course, the instructor can also assign the students to read the district court opinion or
the Eighth Circuit opinion. Even though I did not assign these cases, many of my students looked
them up on Westlaw simply because they were interested in reading what the outcome was and
how the court would reach a result.
29. I ask the students to spot the property law issues as well. After viewing the video,
several students also wanted to discuss the evidence, privilege, and criminal law issues
surrounding the search of the Black Hills' office for records of fossils that allegedly originated on
federal lands.
30. Obviously, the hypothetical can be changed to make the facts more or less favorable for
Williams.
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arguments, the instructor can always ask one group of students to represent
Williams, another to represent Larson, and others to represent the Cheyenne
River Sioux and the federal government.
No matter whether they are arguing the pros and cons of applying a
particular doctrine, I either ask one of the students who is among the "dis-
cussion leaders" for the day (or a volunteer)31 to list the various components
of the doctrine. This serves as a review of what the students have
previously learned and helps frame the rest of the discussion. If a student
raises a defense such as undue influence, I ask the student to list the
elements of that defense, and then apply it to the case of T-Rex Sue or a
hypothetical I have devised based on the case. I now turn to the contract
defenses that my contracts students this year were able to dig up.
A. UNILATERAL MISTAKE
One potentially applicable contract defense that students raise is
unilateral mistake. After all, Williams had no idea that he had a dinosaur
on his land, and even when apprised of the fact that the team had found a T-
Rex there, he had no conception of its value.
The law and economics view of unilateral mistake is that the doctrine is
actually a way of analyzing information asymmetries. One party, with su-
perior information, uses that information to "get a better deal" or bargain at
the expense of the party without such information.3 2 The information can
either be gained through careful research, or it may simply be the result of a
"windfall" or otherwise casually acquired. 33 Although one party may have
less information than another, society has made the decision to reward pos-
session of that information; one party may indeed exploit that information
to make a profit.34 On the other hand, there is certain information that
people are not allowed to exploit. As an example of such information, I
31. See infra Part IV (discussing the use of the Socratic method).
32. MARVIN CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
130 (2nd ed. 1993) (citing Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978)).
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Triana Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information and the Law of
Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles to Guide Ethical Decision Making, 48 EMORY L.J.
1255, 1316-26 (1999); Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH L. REV. 508 (1998). Although su-
perior business acumen is rewarded, a defense of unilateral mistake may be available if the non-
mistaken party knew or should have known of the mistake or if enforcing the contract would be
unconscionable. Jones, supra at 1316; Maggs, supra at 526.
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typically discuss the reasons that insider trading on the stock market is
prohibited.35
However, after some discussion, the class comes to the conclusion that
unilateral mistake is a limited doctrine, and that if a party has entered into a
transaction without doing the research that in hindsight seems to have been
essential, that party cannot later recover. 36 If Maurice Williams entered the
contract in a state of willful ignorance, that normally would not be con-
sidered a basis for voiding the contract.
B. UNCONSCIONABILITY
Students initially mention unconscionability as a defense because of
the price differential: Williams sold Sue for $5,000, only a tiny fraction of
the over eight million dollars that the fossil was worth. This is the perfect
time to discuss the factors that might make a contract unconscionable. I ask
the students to recall that there are really two components of uncon-
scionability: procedural unconscionability, in which something has gone
wrong with the process of obtaining assent to the contract; and substantive
unconscionability, in which the terms themselves are so harsh and over-
reaching that no one would voluntarily enter into the contract. 37
The students must analyze the situation using both procedural and
substantive unconscionability doctrines. Although many times the students
only want to talk about the price differential, I remind them that the courts
normally do not analyze the adequacy of consideration and that even a
peppercorn will normally suffice. 38 Rather, to render a contract uncon-
scionable, there must be something more than just the presence of an
"unfair" bargain. In addition, there must be an element of surprise,
misrepresentation, or mistake, along with the seemingly one-sided deal. 39
However, the unconscionability doctrine has been narrowly construed by
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5-1 (2003) (describing what "on the basis of' trading on inside
material information means). This year, I gave the students the basic facts of the Martha Stewart
case as an example of insider trading. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, Executives on Trial: Criminal
Convictions of Stewart, Bacanovic Aid SEC's Civil Case, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at Cl.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1981) ("A party bears the risk of
mistake when... he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge
with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats his limited knowledge as
sufficient....").
37. See Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural
Unconscionability, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 11, 17 (2003-04) (distinguishing between procedural and
substantive unconscionability and proposing a new type of tort action, Consequential Procedural
Unconscionability, for the victims of unconscionable contracts).
38. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.11 (3d ed. 1999) ("As a general rule, the
adequacy of consideration is not a proper subject for judicial scrutiny.") (citation omitted).
39. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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many courts. 40 Of course the students, with perfect hindsight, can say that
they would never enter into such a contract. I use this as an opportunity to
emphasize the difference between ex post and ex ante decision-making.
C. FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, AND CONDITIONS
Larson allegedly made a statement to Williams that the fossil from
Williams' land would remain in Hill City, South Dakota, housed in the
Black Hills Institute's museum. 41 I present a hypothetical to the students in
which the Black Hills Institute representatives make this assertion, but then
change their minds and decide to sell it after excavation because the pristine
state of the skeleton would fetch millions at auction.
I ask the class whether such a "change" in the facts would make any
difference in terms of the validity of the contract with Williams. Although
some students initially said "no," many others thought that it might make a
difference. This group of students said that if the Hill City location was
important to Williams when he assented, and then the location changed, it
might be important enough to make a difference in whether the contract was
enforceable. I use this opportunity to go over the idea of a "material" mis-
representation, and what would be considered important or not important in
terms of inducing someone to assent.
Then, I change the hypothetical to focus on Larson's state of mind. In
one version of the facts, Larson knows the value of the T-Rex and has
already decided that he will move the T-Rex from Hill City and auction it at
the time that he gives Williams the $5,000 check. In the other version of
the facts, he has not yet decided what to do with the T-Rex. I then ask the
class whether the state of mind matters. Inevitably, the class agrees that the
state of mind does matter, and that helps them to distinguish between fraud
and misrepresentation. It also helps them understand the concept of
scienter.
The hypothetical also presents a good opportunity to work on
conditions. The proposition that the T-Rex stays in Hill City could be
thought of as a condition to the contract. Then, I ask the students to identify
what type of condition it is. They usually come up with the right answer,
that it is a condition subsequent. The movement of the dinosaur from Hill
City (an event that happens after the making of the contract) would prevent
the operation of the contract-just as a true condition subsequent would.
Although I articulate to the students the difference between conditions
precedent and conditions subsequent (i.e., the timing), and the impact of the
40. See, e.g. Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976).
41. Curse of T. Rex (Nova television broadcast Feb. 25, 1997).
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distinction (i.e., the burden of proof),42 I also inform the students that
Restatement (Second) of Contracts has done away with this distinction and
true conditions subsequent are rare.43 Nevertheless, I inform the class that
in some jurisdictions the distinction and differential procedural treatment
endure, and the doctrine retains its vitality at least for the purpose of the bar
examination.
D. ECONOMIC DURESS
Although the doctrine of duress has often been limited to physical
circumstances that wrongfully induce a party to enter a contract, i.e., the
paradigmatic "gun to the head" that forces a party to agree, there is also a
subset of duress cases that depends on economic pressure.44 As I explain to
my students, however, many times the parties are contracting for neces-
sities, such as food, shelter, and medical care.45 However, these situations
are not normally viewed as instances of economic duress, even though one
party may desperately "need" the good or service that the seller is
providing.
Initially, it is tempting for students to look to economic duress as a
doctrine that would serve as a defense to Maurice Williams' performance of
the contract. That is because the Nova video tells them that the Pine Ridge
Indian Reservation, within a hundred miles of Hill City, is one of the most
economically deprived areas of the United States.a6 With unemployment
42. See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1007 (3d Cir. 1980)
("The generally accepted rule is that the burden of proof in regard to a condition precedent is on
the party alleging the breach of the conditional promise."); 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD
A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 38:26 (4th ed. 2000) ("Illf the promise is stated in
absolute terms so that it stands complete by itself, but is followed by a further statement that the
duty will be terminated if a certain contingency occurs.. . this for... throw[s] upon the defendant
the burden of both pleading and proving the proviso .. "); see id. § 38:9 (defining condition
subsequent).
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 224 (1981). I give the class a number of
examples of a condition subsequent, but the best example I have come across was the example
Professor Einer Elhauge gave to my first-year contracts class, based on the facts of Gray v.
Gardner. The case involved a buyer in Nantucket harbor, who made a contract with a captain to
purchase his cargo of whale oil, unless another ship arrived in the harbor within the next week.
Gray v. Gardner, 17 Mass. 188, 188 (1821).
44. FARNSWORTH, supra note 36, at §§ 4.16-.17.
45. Joseph W. Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property,
90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1291-92 (1996) (explaining original justification for public
accommodations law was access to such necessities while traveling).
46. As described by the Wall Street Journal, "Itihe community has the shortest life
expectancy of anywhere in the Western Hemisphere outside Haiti: 48 years old for men and 52 for
women.... Nearly half the tribe's population is destitute. The unemployment rate is about 75%.
There is no bank, no motel, no movie theater." Jonathan Eig, Grave Success: Where Poverty,
Death Walk Hand in Hand, A Profitable Exception, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2002, at A 1, available at
2002 WL-WSJ 3387689. The plight of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation is also described in
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hovering above seventy percent, residents of the reservation are prone to
many of the ills associated with poverty: domestic violence, substance
abuse, and disease.47 Surely, if anyone is entitled to a defense based on
economic necessity, it would be a Pine Ridge resident.
However, there are problems with the economic duress defense, start-
ing with the point that the doctrine is a narrow one.48 Generally, individuals
are not allowed to escape their contractual obligations merely because their
own economic circumstances were dire at the time they entered the
contract. 49 In addition, when economic duress is viewed as a valid defense,
it is usually because the party who is attempting to enforce the contract had
a hand in creating the underlying economic necessity that drove the other
party into the contract. In that sense, economic duress involves more of a
type of "opportunism" or excessive gouging of the other party rather than
one party's dire poverty.50
Applying the doctrine of economic duress, it becomes evident that,
while a possibility, it is probably not the best choice. Although Williams
lived on the reservation in an economically depressed area, there are no
facts to suggest that the fossil hunters helped to create the poor conditions
only to turn around and exploit them.5' Rather, a large part of the poverty
appears to be the result of years of misguided governmental policies and
agency mismanagement, and the residents' reactions to such policies.
Under these circumstances, I explain to the students that any attempt to
assert a defense of economic duress will likely fail.
E. UNDUE INFLUENCE
Yet another possible defense that a lawyer for Williams could deploy
would be the doctrine of undue influence. Doctrinally, undue influence
might be seen as a combination of duress, unequal bargaining power, and
reduced capacity. 52 There is a multi-factor test that the courts use to
books too numerous to mention. See, e.g., MARY CROW DOG, LAKOTA WOMAN (1991) (detailing
personal experiences of a Native American woman); IAN FRAZIER, ON THE REZ 3-19 (2001)
(describing author's observations of the Pine Ridge reservation).
47. See Eig, supra note 46.
48. FARNSWORTH, supra note 38, at § 4.16 (describing strict test for duress).
49. Hackley v. Headley, 8 N.W. 511,514 (Mich. 1881).
50. I often give my students examples of business practices and ask them to articulate the
difference between shrewd business tactics (i.e., examples of good capitalism) versus instances
where they think one party is taking an unfair advantage of the other. Unsurprisingly, I get many
different responses when I try to get them to articulate precisely where the differences lie.
51. That is, except in the most general way that whites remain the beneficiaries of
government policies that have exploited Native Americans for their lands.
52. BARNETT, supra note 17, at 996.
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determine whether a contract is void on the grounds of undue influence. 53
These factors include the number of individuals attempting to persuade the
contracting party, extreme high pressure sales tactics, coercive timing, and
the like.54
I have the students think about the facts, and they mostly conclude that,
although we do not know very much about the process of contract forma-
tion between Williams and Black Hills, it likely was not a case of undue
influence. However, upon changing the hypothetical around to include a
knock on the door in the middle of the night, with ten fossil hunters from
the Black Hills present on the doorstep, who all demand that Williams
assent, the class reaches a different conclusion.
F. ABILITY TO SELL
The actual court case, however, was decided not on the basis of a
contract defense, but rather on a fundamental property and contract law
principle: in general,55 you cannot sell what you do not own. 56 In general,
if one owns subject to a restriction, the transferee takes subject to that
restriction as well. 57
Here, Williams did not own the "land," e.g. the dinosaur, in fee simple.
Rather, the federal government held the land in trust for Williams. 58
According to the terms of the trust, alienation could only take place with the
53. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield Sch. Dist., 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539-41 (1966).
54. Id. at 541.
55. The reason I add the caveat "in general" is that a colleague rightly pointed out that (1)
the concept of adverse possession carries with it some ownership rights, see, e.g., Jeffrey Evans
Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419 (2001); (2) people sell or gift
property they do not own, often with the intent of acquiring the property later, such as in after-
acquired title or deed by estoppel, see, e.g., 23 AM. JUR. 2D Deeds § 277 (2002); (3) stock puts
and calls, see, e.g., Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of
1987: The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 2006 n.71 (1988)
(discussing options); and, (4) a finder can sell something and the purchaser gets the right to keep it
unless the true owner appears, see, e.g., I AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property
§ 23 (1994).
56. See, e.g., Moore & Co. v. Robinson, 62 Ala. 537, 543 (1878) ("Mr. Benjamin, in his
excellent book on sales of personal property, says: 'In general, no man can sell goods, and convey
a valid title to them, unless he be the owner, or lawfully represent the owner. Nemo dat, quod non
habit.-Benj. on Sales, § 6."'); Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. George N. Sparling Coal Co., 143 P.
815, 818 (Colo. Ct. App. 1914) ("The general rule of law is that a purchaser of merchandise takes
only such title as his seller has and is authorized to transfer; that he acquires precisely the interest
which the seller owns, and no other or greater."); Barlow v. Stevenson, C.A. No. 1998-12-118,
2000 Del. C.P. LEXIS 62, *4 (Del. Ct. Common Pleas July 19, 2000); Inmi-Etti v. Aluisi, 492
A.2d 917, 920-922 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (holding that "purchaser can take only those rights
which his transferor has in the subject goods").
57. Barlow, 2000 Del. C.P. Lexis 62, at *5.
58. Black Hills Inst. of Geological Research v. S.D. Sch. of Mines & Tech., 12 F.3d 737, at
742-43 (8th Cir. 1993).
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permission of the government.59 Thus, Williams could not sell the dinosaur
when he had no right to alienate it. From a contract perspective, one could
also say that the requirement of government permission was a condition
precedent to the sale, albeit one that neither party was aware of at the time
of the contract.
Ultimately, in deciding the case, the court bypassed, for the most part,
common law contract defenses, but the case certainly makes for an
interesting classroom discussion, and one that will test students' knowledge
of the contract defenses materials.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING CONTRACT DEFENSES: LAW
TEACHING BEYOND THE SOCRATIC METHOD
The teaching module described above (1) uses technology; (2) uses a
problem-based approach; and (3) promotes active learning.60  This is
purposeful and represents my belief that a law professor can-and
should-teach a basic first year course with techniques that go beyond the
Socratic method. 6 1
In the past two decades, the Socratic method has come under attack
from numerous commentators, although the method certainly also has its
defenders. 62 A sampling of the recent scholarship reveals a growing
uneasiness about the pedagogical value of the method. In the immortal
words of Grant Gilmore, the Socratic method too often results in a class-
room where "never is heard an encouraging word and the thoughts remain
cloudy all day." 63 Deborah Rhode documents many similar problems, and
extensively lists the shortcomings of the Socratic method. 64 Her critique
59. See id. at 742.
60. Essentially, in designing the course module, I drew on the literature promoting
excellence in law school classroom teaching, including GERALD F. HESS & S TEVEN I.
FRIEDLAND, TECHNIQUES FOR TEACHING LAW (Carolina Academic Press 1999); Alexander J.
Bolla, Jr., Reflections from the Total Quality Management Casefile in Legal Education, 43
EMORY L.J. 541 passim (1994); Gerald F. Hess, Listening to our Students: Obstructing and
Enhancing Learning in Law School, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 941 passim (1997).
61. Indeed, some commentators have already been busy describing the demise of the Socratic
method. See Orin S. Kerr, The Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113
passim (1999).
62. See, e.g. James R. Beattie, Jr., Socratic Ignorance: Once More Into the Cave, 105 W.
VA. L. REV. 471, 484-93 (2003) (setting out the criticisms of the Socratic method, including
humiliation of students, hiding the ball, creating combative students, and silencing women and
minorities, yet then inexplicably concluding that the Socratic method is valuable); Phillip E.
Areeda, The Socratic Method, 109 HARV. L. REV. 911, 921-22 (1996) (providing an outline of a
talk explaining proper use of Socratic Method).
63. Grant Gilmore, What Is a Law School?, 15 CONN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
64. Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1558-59 (1993).
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focuses on the fact that the Socratic method teaches law students to divorce
legal thought from the interpersonal ways of thinking that most people have
before attending law school, which are of vital importance when dealing
with clients in the real world.65
At the same time, recent critiques have also articulated the psycho-
logical harms that prey on students as a result of the Socratic method.66
Feminists have argued that the Socratic method tends to have a disparate
impact on female law students, preventing women from reaching their full
potential in the classroom. 67 Critical race theorists use much the same
argument, persuasively stating that the Socratic method also silences
minority students.68 Additionally, there are the voices of the students who
inevitably discuss the incredible anxiety and pressure that the Socratic
Method imposes. 69
The point here is that a professor has a number of different tools at his
or her disposal, and the lesson that I have described above attempts to
employ a number of different techniques. The T-Rex Sue module uses
technology, problem-based learning, and even humor to get its point across.
70 At the end of the day, the students have learned contract defenses,
articulated arguments, and have evolved as legal thinkers.
65. Id. at 1559.
66. For discussion of the effect of the Socratic method on the physiological and
psychological health and well-being of law students see Suzanne C. Sergerstrom, Perceptions of
Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 593, 594 (1996)
(documenting, among law students subjected to the Socratic Method, "extreme self-punishing
attitudes, obsessive self-doubt, apathy, withdrawal from normal activities, fear, apprehension, a
sense of impending doom, and panic attacks"). See also Phyllis W. Beck & David Bums, Anxiety
and Depression in Law Students: Cognitive Intervention, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 270, 285-86 (1980);
Julie E. Buchwald, Confronting a Hazard: Do Eating Disorders Plague Women in the Legal
Profession?, 9 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 101, 117-19 (1999); James B. Taylor, Law
School Stress and the "Ddformation Professionelle", 27 J. LEGAL EDuC. 251, 253-54 (1975);
Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal
Education, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 93, 121-22 (1968).
67. See, e.g., LANi GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 28 (Beacon Press 1997) (discussing how female law students can feel
alienated by the Socratic method); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, "To Give Them Countenance": The
Case for a Women's Law School, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 11-13 (1999) (asserting that women
do not speak as frequently or as often in the law school classroom as men).
68. See Ruta K. Stropus, Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law
School Methodology in the 21st Century, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 449, 462-65 (1996) (asserting that
traditional law school teaching methods segregate minority students and that those methods often
reflect "white male values").
69. See, e.g., Paula Garber, "Just Trying to be Human in this Place": The Legal Education of
Twenty Women, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 201-03 (1998) (describing the author's feeling of
being "terrified" and "flustered" to be called on in her civil procedure class).
70. John J. Capowski, Evidence and the One-Liner: A Beginning Evidence Professor's
Exploration of the Use of Humor in the Law School Classroom, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 877 (2003)
(exploring the fairly obvious idea that humor can help students relax and make the doctrine more
interesting and memorable).
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